The first-sale doctrine : parallel importation and beyond by Karjiker, Sadulla
633
THE FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE: PARALLEL 
IMPORTATION AND BEYOND
S Karjiker
BSc LLB LLM LLD
Associate Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, Stellenbosch University
1 Introduction
In 2013, the United States (“US”) Supreme Court gave its judgment in 
Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons Inc,
1
 which appeared to fundamentally change 
the US’ position in relation to copyright law and parallel importation. The 
aforementioned judgment serves as an ideal opportunity to reflect on the 
corresponding legal position in South Africa. As will be illustrated, not only 
is the South African position very different from that which now exists in 
the US, but it is striking how different the US legal analysis is from that 
under South African law. This article will use the Kirtsaeng case to highlight 
the shortcomings in our current approach to copyright law and parallel 
importation, and the need to re-evaluate our legal position. Consideration of 
the legal position relating to parallel importation is not an esoteric, academic 
indulgence. The law in this area helps to determine the type of market which 
may exist for a particular product, and could affect consumer welfare. 
This article will illustrate that our approach to parallel importation is a 
rather narrow, literal one – based on questionable authority. It is an approach, 
which fails to properly consider the appropriate domain of copyright law, and 
fails to have regard to its purpose. What we require is a more far-reaching 
analysis of parallel importation, based on principles, and the effects on 
consumer welfare, which will provide a proper basis for future challenges that 
will be posed in this field by developments such as the emergence of digital 
copyright works.
It is submitted that the first-sale doctrine,2 also known as the doctrine of 
exhaustion, is an issue which is central to parallel importation (although it 
potentially goes beyond parallel importation), but it has received no serious 
consideration in our law. Briefly, the first-sale doctrine serves to prevent a 
copyright owner from controlling the sales of copies of its copyright work 
beyond their initial, authorised distribution. This article will consider the 
origin and legal basis of the first-sale doctrine, with specific reference to 
copyright law. As will be illustrated, while our courts have refused to consider 
it as a legal principle, it features prominently in US (and European) case law. 
The failure to consider the first-sale doctrine when dealing with the question 
1 
Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons Inc 2013 133 S Ct 1351.
2 
Although in most literature the term “first sale doctrine” (that is, without the hyphen between “first” and 
“sale”) is used, the hyphen is grammatically required.
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of parallel importation in South African law has, arguably, led to our rather 
superficial treatment of subject. 
At the outset, it is important to make it clear that this article’s focus on US 
law should not be construed as suggesting that we should simply follow its 
legal position, due to the importance of that jurisdiction in matters concerning 
intellectual property law. There are two reasons for considering the 
comparative position in US law. First, it was US law which initially developed 
the first-sale doctrine in relation to intellectual property, and to demonstrate its 
common-law origin. In other words, the US legal position is merely indicative 
of how significant the first-sale doctrine could be in relation to an issue such 
as parallel importation. Second, it also illustrates what could happen if the 
rationale for a legal principle is forgotten, and when it is then subsequently 
simply applied in a rigid and institutionalised manner. As will be illustrated 
below, even though legal analysis in the US has generally included an acute 
awareness of the economic consequences of legal regulation, it has, arguably, 
failed to appropriately apply the first-sale doctrine in relation to digital works, 
appropriately. Although the focus of this work is not the application of the 
first-sale doctrine to digital works, it does illustrate how having a developed 
legal principle such as the first-sale doctrine would enable us to address future 
challenges, which will be posed to copyright law as a consequence of the 
emergence of digital copyright works, in a principled manner. In other words, 
far from suggesting that our law should be based on the legal interpretation of 
a single jurisdiction, the focus on US law relating to the first-sale doctrine also 
serves as a cautionary tale.
After an introduction to the relevant copyright law, this article will provide 
an outline of parallel importation, and the reason for its existence. The origins, 
purpose, and effect of the first-sale doctrine will then be introduced. This will 
be followed by a consideration of the respective copyright-law positions in 
the US and South Africa concerning parallel importation, and a critique of 
the South African legal position. Central to the criticism of our muddled legal 
position concerning parallel importation has been the refusal by our courts to 
consider the first-sale doctrine. For completeness, further developments in the 
US and Europe concerning the first-sale doctrine in relation to digital works 
will also be considered. 
2 Copyright law
Copyright protection only exists by virtue of the rights granted pursuant to 
the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (“SA Copyright Act”).
3
 Our copyright law has 
its origins in English law, and, already back in the 18th century, the House 
of Lords rejected the notion of any common-law copyright in Donaldson v 
Becket.
4
 Copyright protection, therefore, cannot extend beyond the rights 
expressly provided for by statute. The SA Copyright Act specifies the 
types of works, which are eligible for copyright protection, and determines 
3 
Northern Office Microcomputers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 4 SA 123 (C) 128.
4 
17 Parl Hist Eng 953 (HL 1774).
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the scope of protection in respect of each type of eligible work.
5
 For each 
type of eligible work, the act defines the exclusive rights granted to the 
copyright owner.
6
 These exclusive rights are sometimes also referred to as the 
“restricted acts”. For example, the owner of a literary work has the exclusive 
right to reproduce or publish the work, perform the work in public, or make 
an adaptation (including a translation) of the work.
7
 Performing any of the 
specified restricted acts in respect of a copyright work, or any substantial part 
thereof, without the permission of the copyright owner constitutes copyright 
infringement.
8
 These forms of infringement constitute so-called “primary,” 
or “direct,” infringement.
9
 In addition to the primary forms of infringement, 
the SA Copyright Act also makes provision for so-called “secondary” (or 
“indirect”) infringement, and criminal infringement: these are additional 
acts that cannot be performed without the copyright owner’s permission.
10
 
Secondary infringement is provided for in section 23(2) of the SA Copyright 
Act, which provides as follows:
Without derogating from the generality of subsection (1), copyright shall be infringed by any person 
who, without the licence of the owner of the copyright and at a time when copyright subsists in a 
work –
(a)  imports an article into the Republic for a purpose other than for his private and domestic use;
(b)  sells, lets, or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire in the Republic any article;
(c)  distributes in the Republic any article for the purposes of trade, or for any other purpose, to such 
an extent that the owner of the copyright in question is prejudicially affected; or
(d)  acquires an article relating to a computer program in the Republic,
if to his knowledge the making of that article constituted an infringement of that copyright or would 
have constituted such an infringement if the article had been made in the Republic [underlining 
added].
The various forms of secondary (and criminal) infringement serve to 
protect the copyright owner’s market for its copyright work, in order that 
it can effectively exploit such market. Essentially, secondary infringement 
seeks to prevent the commercial exploitation of infringing articles, that is, 
articles which were produced as a result of primary infringement.
11
 However, 
as should be apparent from what follows, acts of secondary infringement may 
also be possible in relation to articles which are deemed to constitute infringing 
articles. For present purposes, the relevant rights given to a copyright owner 
to prevent secondary infringement are the right to control the importation 
of copies of its copyright work into South Africa (other than for private and 
domestic use) and to distribute the work in South Africa.
12
 In fact, from an 
5 
S 2(1) of the SA Copyright Act.
6 
Ss 6-11B.
7 
S 6.
8 
S 23(1), as read with s 1(2A).
9 
O Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law 14 ed (2012) 1-65.
10 
Ss 23(2) and (3), and s 27 of the SA Copyright Act. In contrast to primary infringement, both these forms 
of infringement will only have taken place provided that there was knowledge of its unlawfulness on the 
part of the person engaged in the relevant activity. Although not relevant for the purposes of this article, 
for completeness, while constructive (or inferred) knowledge is sufficient for infringement pursuant to s 
23(2), actual knowledge is required for purposes of s 27.
11 
L Bently & B Sherman Intellectual Property Law 3 ed (2009) 195; T Hart & L Fazzani Intellectual 
Property Law 3 ed (2004) 171.
12 
S 23(2) of the SA Copyright Act.
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economic point of view, in the context of parallel importation these two rights 
can, collectively, be categorised as the copyright owner’s “distribution right”.
13
Although section 23(2), which deals with secondary infringement, does 
not expressly state that the particular exclusive acts must involve infringing 
articles, or, more specifically, “infringing copies,” as defined in section 1, it 
must “as a matter of logic and fact” involve such articles.
14 Section 1 defines 
an “infringing copy” as follows:
“infringing copy”, in relation to – 
(a)  a literary, musical or artistic work or a published edition, means a copy thereof;
(b)  a sound recording, means a record embodying that recording;
(c)  a cinematograph film, means a copy of the film or a still photograph made therefrom;
(d)  a broadcast, means a cinematograph film of it or a copy of a cinematograph film of it or a 
sound recording of it or a record embodying a sound recording of it or a still photograph made 
therefrom; and
(e)  a computer program, means a copy of such computer program, 
being in any such case an article the making of which constituted an infringement of the copyright 
in the work, recording, cinematograph film, broadcast or computer program or, in the case of an 
imported article, would have constituted an infringement of that copyright if the article had been made 
in the Republic [underlining added];
Thus, the SA Copyright Act provides that an infringing copy is a copy of 
a copyright work made by infringement of the copyright in that work, or, in 
the case of an imported article, would have constituted an infringement of 
that copyright if it had been made in South Africa.
15
 It is the interpretation of 
the latter deeming provision in the last paragraph of section 23(2) (underlined 
above), and which is substantially repeated in the definition of “infringing 
copy” (also underlined above) – the “deeming provision” – which has been 
central to the use of copyright law in preventing parallel importation into 
South Africa.
In order to appreciate the scope of copyright law it is important to note 
that copyright protection is afforded to works such as literary or artistic 
works, irrespective of their literary or artistic quality, which means that rather 
mundane items may include, or comprise, copyright works.
16
 For example, 
statement-of-account forms,
17
 spare-parts catalogues,
18
 package inserts 
for medicines,
19
 a technical drawing of a hydraulic ram,
20
 the drawing of a 
13 
The categorisation of the two exclusive rights, collectively, as the copyright owner’s distribution right 
is not unusual. For example, the equivalent provision to s 23(2) in the UK is considered to generally be 
concerned with the right to control the distribution of copies of the copyright work, or the “stages of 
exploitation” of the copyright work (see Bently & Sherman Intellectual Property Law 195, and W Cornish 
Intellectual Property 3 ed (1996) 374). Incidentally, to date, I have found no explanation (whether in case 
law or secondary sources) of what s 23(2)(d), which concerns the acquisition of “an article relating to a 
computer program” in South Africa, was meant to deal with.
14 
O Dean “Parallel Importation: Infringement of Copyright” (1983) 100 SALJ 258 261-262; Dean Handbook 
of South African Copyright Law 1-81 and 1-82. Although it is submitted that this is correct, it does make 
the section somewhat tautologous as the key quality of what constitutes an article an infringing copy is 
repeated in s 23(2).
15 
S 1 (sv “infringing copy”) and s 23(2) of the SA Copyright Act.
16 
S 1 (sv “artistic work” and “literary work”).
17 
Accesso CC v Allforms (Pty) Ltd 1998 4 All SA 655 (T).
18 
Payen Components SA Ltd v Bovic CC 1995 4 SA 441 (A).
19 
Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group Plc 2002 4 SA 249 (SCA).
20 
Pan African Engineers (Pty) Ltd v Hydro Tube (Pty) Ltd 1972 1 SA 470 (W).
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mechanical face-loading shovel,
21 and football-fixture lists,22 have all been 
held to be eligible for copyright protection. In other words, although copyright 
protection is commonly associated with the protection of works of literature 
or the art works of recognised artists (and may have initially been justified on 
the basis that it would provide protection to such works), copyright protection 
also extends to aspects of common consumer goods to the extent that the 
packaging, or labels, used in respect of such items may embody material 
which are protectable as literary or artistic works. As will be illustrated 
below, it is this fact that has enabled copyright law to be used, with remarkable 
effectiveness, to prevent parallel importation.
US copyright law mirrors South African copyright law, and the US 
Copyright Act of 1976 contains equivalent provisions. For example, a 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights are set out in section 106, which includes 
the right to distribute the copyright work, and is equivalent to the right to 
publish and distribute the work under South African law. The right to control 
the importation of copies of its copyright work is set out in section 602(a)
(1), which provides that importing a copy without the copyright owner’s 
permission violates the owner’s exclusive distribution right. Importantly, in the 
context of parallel importation, section 602(a)(2) of the US Copyright Act has 
a substantively equivalent concept to our “infringing copy” as something will 
be an infringing item if the making of it “either constituted an infringement 
of copyright, or which would have constituted an infringement of copyright if 
this title had been applicable.”
3 Definition of parallel importation
Providing a universal definition of what constitutes parallel importation 
is not easily done because intellectual property law is territorial in nature. 
Equivalent, or corresponding, rights could be held by different parties 
in the various jurisdictions, and whether something is considered to be an 
infringing parallel importation will depend on the law of the jurisdiction into 
which it is imported (usually, with reference to its doctrine of exhaustion). 
For example, the initial copyright owner of a literary work may assign the 
copyright in country X to party A, and assign the copyright in country Y to 
party B. By splitting the ownership of the copyright in the various countries, 
and depending on the copyright law of a particular jurisdiction, a copy of 
the literary work emanating from another jurisdiction could constitute an 
unlawful parallel import in the first jurisdiction.
However, for purposes of the definition that follows, we can assume that 
there are two jurisdictions in which the relevant intellectual property (such 
as a trademark or copyright work) is owned by the same person (the “IP 
owner”) in both jurisdictions. Parallel imports, or so-called “grey” goods, 
commonly refer to goods which include, or comprise, intellectual property 
(such as a trademark or a copyright work) and have been manufactured in one 
21 
Scaw Metals Ltd v Apex Foundry (Pty) Ltd 1982 2 SA 377 (D).
22 
National Soccer League t/a Premier Soccer League v Gidani (Pty) Ltd 2014 2 All SA 461 (GJ).
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jurisdiction by, or with the permission of, the IP owner, and those goods are 
then imported by another party (the “importer”) into the other jurisdiction 
(the “second jurisdiction”) without the IP owner’s permission.
23
 In the 
second jurisdiction, the rights to trade in such goods are often granted to an 
exclusive licensee or distributor (“exclusive trader”). The term “parallel” thus 
connotes the fact that the goods have originated from another, corresponding 
(or parallel) intellectual property right in another jurisdiction. These are, 
therefore, not pirated, or counterfeit, goods as they have been produced by, 
or with the consent of, the relevant intellectual property rights owner in the 
jurisdiction in which they were produced.
As will become clear, and as already illustrated above, parallel importation 
also includes the situation where the intellectual property rights in the second 
jurisdiction may be owned by someone other than the IP owner, although the 
intellectual property rights in both jurisdictions (ultimately) originate from the 
same person. So, for example, in the locus classicus on the use of copyright 
law to prevent parallel importation in South African law – the Frank & Hirsch 
case
24
 –TDK Electronics Co Ltd of Japan (“TDK Japan”) originally owned the 
relevant copyright works.
25
 TDK Japan then subsequently assigned its South 
African copyright in the copyright works to Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd (“Frank 
& Hirsch”), the exclusive trader in South Africa.
26
 
This article will focus on the legal position of parallel imports which include, 
or comprise, copyright works, not other forms of intellectual property.
4 Why does parallel importation exist?
Parallel importation relies on an elementary business concept: arbitrage. 
Arbitrageurs exploit price differences that exist in different markets. Firms, 
for various reasons, sell the same (or similar) goods at different prices in 
various markets. If a price difference is sufficiently significant, it serves as 
an incentive for an arbitrageur, who could make a profit (having factored in 
its transport costs, and any applicable taxes and currency exchange rates) by 
importing goods from the market in which they are priced more cheaply. 
There may be sound economic reasons for price differences in various 
markets. For example, an obvious reason may be that there are lower 
production costs in one jurisdiction when compared to another, which has 
been the principal reason why businesses in some countries have outsourced 
the manufacture of their products to lower-cost jurisdictions countries such as 
China. Of course, the decision to charge different prices in different markets 
may simply be to maximise profits, and by setting the prices to what the 
relevant market can bear to achieve that objective.
23 
O Dean & C Puckrin “South African Case Law on the Infringement of Copyright by Parallel Importation” 
(1983) 7 EIPR 190 190; K Rippel & R De Villiers “Legalising Parallel Imports Under Intellectual Property 
Law” (2004) 3 Stell LR 550 550.
24 
Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v A Roopanand Brothers (Pty) Ltd 1993 4 SA 279 (A).
25 
282.
26 
283.
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Although this article will consider some of the economic issues relating to 
parallel importation, in the absence of empirical evidence, it is not possible 
to make any definitive statements about the preferred economic approach to 
parallel importation.
27
 Therefore, it is important to note that the purpose of this 
article is not to suggest that parallel importation should always be permitted, 
or that there should be absolutely no price discrimination in the various 
markets. While it may suggest a preference in relation to the economic aspects 
of parallel importation – based on general propositions – its ambit is more 
modest: why has there been no serious engagement of the first-sale doctrine 
in relation to the use of copyright law to prevent parallel importation? As will 
be illustrated, engagement with the first-sale doctrine should assist greatly in 
determining the appropriate scope of copyright law, and avoid our current, 
rather superficial and literal, approach to question of parallel importation.
5 The first-sale doctrine
The first-sale doctrine serves to prevent a copyright owner from controlling 
the sales of copies of its copyright work beyond their initial, authorised 
distribution. Although the first-sale doctrine will only be considered in 
relation to copyright law, it also applies to products protected by patents or 
trademarks.
28 The first-sale doctrine limits the copyright owner’s exclusive 
distribution rights by preventing further post-sale restraints on the distribution 
of copyrighted works. In the Kirtsaeng case, it was said to derive from English 
law and originated with the sale of movable property since at least the 15th 
century, and it served to prevent anti-competitive behaviour,
29
 by restricting a 
copyright owner’s control over further distribution.
30
 In copyright jargon, the 
first sale is said to terminate, or “exhaust,” the copyright owner’s exclusive 
distribution right.
31
 Thus, as stated before, the concept of exhaustion (or the 
doctrine of exhaustion) is an alternative description of the first-sale doctrine.32
It is important to note that the first-sale doctrine is a common-law principle, 
which was first recognised in the case of Bobbs–Merrill Co v Straus & 
Another
33
.
34 Although the first-sale doctrine was subsequently embodied as 
27 
No economic analysis appears to have been conducted in South Africa on the impact of our current 
legal position relating to parallel importation. In Australia, legislative change was preceded by such 
an impact study (see L Longdin “Copyright: The Last Trade Barrier in a Globalised World?” (2006) 
Birkbeck University of London <http://www.copyright.bbk.ac.uk/contents/conferences/2006/longdinl.
pdf> (accessed 15-09-2015) 1 9-10).
28 
W Hansen & S Morales “John Wiley & Sons Case: Limits on the First Sale Doctrine on US Copyright 
Law” (2012) 34 EIPR 558 558.
29 
2013 133 S Ct 1372.
30 
1387-1388.
31 
1355.
32 
 R Clark “Exhaustion, Geographical Licensing Restrictions and Transfer Prohibitions: Two Surprising 
Decisions” (2013) 8 JIPLP 460 460.
33 
Bobbs-Merrill Co v Straus & Another 1908 210 US 339.
34 
Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons Inc 2013 133 S Ct 1363; Vernor v Autodesk Inc 2010 621 F 3d 1102 1107; 
Capitol Records LLC v ReDigi Inc 2013 934 F Supp 2d 640 653. See also N Samanta & S Sen “Copyright 
Exhaustion in India and the USA: A Comparative Critique” (2009) 4 JIPLP 827 829; M Collins “Crossing 
Parallel Lines: The State of the First Sale Doctrine After Costco v. Omega” (2012) 8 Buff Intell Prop LJ 
26 29; A Katz “The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints” (2014) 1 BYU Law 
Review 55 64.
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a statutory provision in the US Copyright Acts of 1909, 1947 and 1976,
35
 it 
has remained essentially a common-law principle and is not restricted by its 
statutory form.
36
 In other words, its statutory embodiment does not amount to 
an exhaustive codification of the doctrine.
The effect of the first-sale doctrine is that once a copy of a copyright work 
has been lawfully sold (or its ownership otherwise lawfully transferred), the 
buyer of that copy, and subsequent owners, are free to dispose of it as they 
wish.
37
 In other words, while a copyright owner may prevent others from 
performing any of the exclusive rights afforded by copyright law, once a copy 
of the copyright work has been distributed by, or with the authorisation of, the 
copyright owner, the copyright owner’s distribution rights are exhausted and 
it is not allowed to control further sales or transfers thereof.
38
 It should be 
noted that it applies to any kind of authorised distribution. Notwithstanding its 
suggestive name, the doctrine does not only apply when a copy is first sold, but 
it also applies when a copy is given away, or title to such copy has otherwise 
been transferred without the accoutrements of a sale. The term “sale” is, thus, 
merely a term of art.
39
The doctrine recognises the detrimental social effect of unduly fettering 
the transfer of property, be it tangible or intangible property. For example, we 
would not consider it to be socially desirable if car manufacturers (or, indeed, 
the manufacturers of any tangible goods) sold us their products subject to 
restrictive conditions on subsequent disposals, such as, the need for us to 
obtain their prior consent for subsequent disposals, or the payment of a fee 
in return for such permission. Likewise, why should copyright owners be 
allowed to control the further transfers of lawful copies of their works? If they 
are to be given such rights, why should such further restrictions not be subject 
to competition law, as may be the case with tangible property? Economically, 
the sale (and subsequent distribution) of copyrighted works should be treated 
like that of any other commercial commodity.
The doctrine is well illustrated by the seminal case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
Bobbs-Merrill Co sought to restrain the respondents, retailers, from selling 
copies of its copyrighted novel for less than $1 each. Each printed copy 
contained a notice that retailers were not “licensed to sell” it for less than $1, 
and to do so would be treated as copyright infringement (“the restriction”).
40
 
The respondents had purchased the copies from third parties who were under 
no obligation to enforce the restriction, or only to sell to retail dealers who 
agreed to observe the restriction.
41
 However, Bobbs-Merrill Co (as copyright 
owner) claimed that its rights to prevent the sales by the respondents derived 
from copyright law. More particularly, it claimed that its power to control 
35 
Collins (2012) Buff Intell Prop LJ 29.
36 
Samanta & Sen (2009) JIPLP 827; Collins (2012) Buff Intell Prop LJ 30; Katz (2014) BYU Law Review 
130.
37 
Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons Inc 2013 133 S Ct 1355.
38 
Capitol Records LLC v ReDigi Inc 2013 934 F Supp 2d 653; UMG Recordings Inc v Augusto 2011 628 F 
3d 1175 1180. See also Hansen & Morales 558.
39 
UMG Recordings Inc v Augusto 1179.
40 
Bobbs-Merrill Co v Straus & Another 1908 210 US 341.
41 
341-342.
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further sales derived from its exclusive right to “vend” (or right of exclusive 
sale
42
) its copyrighted book.
43
 Of course, this is the equivalent of the modern 
distribution right.
In Bobbs-Merrill Co the court held that the distribution right did not permit 
the plaintiff to dictate that subsequent sales of the work below a stipulated 
price would amount to copyright infringement.
44
 The court held that the 
extent of copyright protection is wholly determined by statute,
45
 and that the 
scope of protection should extend only so far as the benefits were intended to 
be granted.
46
 The principal exclusive right afforded by copyright protection 
is to produce copies of the copyright work for financial gain.47 Where a 
copyright owner has sold a copy of copyright work for a satisfactory price, 
and passed full dominion over that article to the purchaser, it has no right to 
control any subsequent sale of it. This would also be the position if the copy of 
the copyright work contained a notice that a sale below a stipulated price will 
be treated as copyright infringement.
48
 Copyright protection does not give a 
copyright owner the right to impose, by notice, a restriction, or limitation, on 
subsequent purchasers with whom there is no privity of contract.
49
5 1 Rationale for the first-sale doctrine
The first-sale doctrine could be said to operate as a form of common-law 
competition law; in particular, it evidences a general hostility to agreements 
imposing vertical restraints.
50
 In the Kirtsaeng case (discussed below), the 
court expressly recognised that a copyright owner should not be permitted to 
exercise perpetual control over the distribution of copies of a copyright work; 
if such control continued, the copyright owner could control the price at which 
lawfully-purchased copies of its work were subsequently sold.
51
The purpose of the doctrine of exhaustion is to avoid partitioning of markets 
for copyright works by limiting restrictions on the distribution of those works 
to what is necessary to safeguard the interest of the copyright owner in the 
particular copyright work.
52
5 2 Scope of the first-sale doctrine
The scope of the first-sale doctrine may be unlimited, or limited with 
reference to a particular jurisdiction or geographic area, also referred to 
as international exhaustion, national exhaustion, or regional exhaustion, 
respectively. In the case of international exhaustion, a copyright owner will 
42 
349.
43 
343.
44 
350-351.
45 
346.
46 
346.
47 
347.
48 
350.
49 
350-1.
50 
Katz (2014) BYU Law Review 66.
51 
2013 133 S Ct 1374.
52 
UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp 2012 C-128/11 3 July 2012 [62].
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have exhausted its exclusive distribution right by the sale of a copy of its work, 
irrespective of the jurisdiction in which it first took place, and, hence, will not 
be able to prevent its distribution in, or importation into, any other jurisdiction 
(provided, of course, that such other jurisdiction adheres to a policy of 
international exhaustion). Pursuant to a principle of national exhaustion, a 
copyright holder’s distribution rights are exhausted only with respect to the 
relevant jurisdiction in which it has first authorised such distribution. Such 
distribution does not exhaust its rights to prevent the distribution of those 
copies of its work in another jurisdiction which, similarly, follows a principle 
of national exhaustion. Regional exhaustion is similar to national distribution, 
except that the distribution rights are only exhausted in the relevant region 
(most notably, the European Union) in which the copies are first distributed, 
and the copyright owner can continue to prevent the distribution of copyright 
works within the specific region which emanate from outside the region.53 
For example, article 4 (and recitals 28 and 29 of the preamble) of the InfoSoc 
Directive expressly establishes a policy of regional exhaustion for the members 
of the European Union.
54
6 Parallel importation and copyright law
We will now proceed with a more detailed account of how copyright law is 
used to prevent parallel importation in South Africa, and then indicate how 
the US Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in the Kirtsaeng case. As stated 
previously, copyright protection is potentially available in respect of rather 
mundane items which may embody, or comprise, literary, or artistic, works. 
The copyright works relied upon to prevent the importation of TDK cassette 
tapes in the Frank & Hirsch case were, inter alia, the pictorial material 
included on the packaging of those tapes (protectable as artistic works), the 
so-called “get-up” of the tapes.
55
Furthermore, it is important to note that, in the assessment of whether there 
has been copyright infringement, it is irrelevant whether the copyright work 
forms an insignificant part of another copyright work or article. As already 
mentioned, the only consideration is whether any of the restricted acts have 
been performed in respect of the copyright work, or any substantial part 
thereof, without the permission of the copyright owner.
56
 Thus, as stated in the 
Frank & Hirsch case, although the copyright work could be a comparatively 
small, or an accessory, part of the imported article, it could render the article 
an infringing copy (because the copyright work is not transferred or forfeited 
because it forms part of the principal thing), with significant consequences for 
the parallel importer. In other words, the principles that deal with the passing, 
53 
Clark (2013) JIPLP 460; P Lim “Copyright in Logos and Exhaustion of Rights Under the Fist Sale 
Doctrine in Grey Markets” (2012) 7 JIPLP 663 664.
54 
Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L 167/10.
55 
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or termination, of ownership in corporeal property – such as the concepts of 
accessio and specificatio - have no relevance to such copyright works.57
As a consequence, copyright law is used to prevent the importation of 
virtually any kind of good, and not just those goods which are typically 
(that is, inherently, or “truly”) associated with copyright protection such as 
books, films and music. The importation of medicines could be prevented, 
not because the particular product is subject to patent protection, but because 
its packaging, or the informational insert accompanying it, is the subject of 
copyright protection. It is this potentially ubiquitous application of copyright 
law, which is somewhat removed from its purpose of incentivising the 
production of creative works, and its potentially iniquitous outcomes, which 
is a source of concern.
6 1 South African law
Whether a parallel import incorporating, or comprising, a copyright work 
into South Africa will be considered to be an infringing copy, and, therefore, 
prohibited, depends on the geographical scope of rights under copyright law 
held by the manufacturer of such article. More particular, if such manufacturer 
also had the right (or permission) to produce such article in South Africa, the 
article will not constitute an infringing copy.
In so far as the interpretation of the words in the deeming provision in 
section 23(2) – “would have constituted such an infringement if the article had 
been made in the Republic” – are concerned, the Appellate Division (as it then 
was) in the Frank & Hirsch case endorsed the decision of the court in Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corporation v Anthony Black Films (Pty) Ltd
58
.
59
 The court 
held that the aforementioned phrase applied only to an imported article, that 
is one not made in South Africa. It required a court to postulate a hypothetical 
situation (or a counterfactual enquiry in US terminology): the imported 
article must be assumed to have been made in South Africa by the person who 
actually made the article in the other jurisdiction from which it originated. If 
that person could lawfully have made it in South Africa – either because it was 
the copyright owner in South Africa, or had such owner’s permission – it will 
not constitute an infringing copy, and, accordingly, there can be no copyright 
infringement. It follows, as a logical corollary, that, if the person who made 
the article in the foreign jurisdiction could not lawfully have made it in South 
Africa (that is, because it was not the South African copyright owner, or did 
not have that person’s consent to do so), it will constitute an infringing copy. 
A person who, with the requisite knowledge,
60
 and without the South African 
copyright owner’s permission, either imports the article into South Africa, or 
57 
1993 4 SA 279 (A) 289-290.
58 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Anthony Black Films (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 582 (W).
59 
1993 4 SA 279 (A) 286.
60 
It was accepted, without the matter having been fully argued, that knowledge in this context means notice 
of facts such as would suggest to a reasonable man that a breach of copyright law was being committed 
(see Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v A Roopanand Brothers (Pty) Ltd 1993 4 SA 279 (A) 289).
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sells or distributes it in South Africa, commits an infringement of copyright 
in terms of section 23(2).
61
This interpretation of section 23(2) creates a device by which a manufacturer 
of an article incorporating, or comprising, a copyright work (or its appointed 
South African exclusive trader) can prevent parallel imports of such an article 
by ensuring that any copyright in the article (or in accompanying material, 
such as the packaging or instructions) is split so as to ensure that the South 
African copyright is owned by a person other than the manufacturer in the 
foreign jurisdiction. For example, a corporate copyright owner can arrange for 
its copyright to be split by assigning the copyright in South Africa (and any 
country which has a similar approach to parallel importation) to a different 
subsidiary, or party. In this manner, it is possible to protect an exclusive trader’s 
market in South Africa against parallel importation; unless the importation 
and distribution of the copyright-protected article has been authorised by the 
South African copyright owner (who could, of course, be the exclusive trader), 
any importation or distribution of the articles manufactured elsewhere would 
be regarded as unlawful, infringing copies. This is notwithstanding the fact 
that the articles were lawfully made elsewhere, possible even by the original 
copyright owner, from whom the South African copyright owner derived its 
rights. Thus, in the Frank & Hirsch case, TDK Japan assigned its copyright 
in the literary or artistic works comprised in the get-up of the TDK cassette 
tapes to Frank & Hirsch.
62
 The effect of the assignment was that no other 
person, including TDK Japan, could import TDK cassette tapes into South 
Africa which included such artistic works without Frank & Hirsch’s consent.
Similarly, in the McCarthy case, McCarthy Ltd (“McCarthy”), as exclusive 
distributor of Yamaha amplifiers, was able to protect its market by getting 
Yamaha Corporation (also of Japan) to assign to McCarthy its South African 
copyright in the design drawings of the front panels of its amplifiers.63 In this 
case, the court considered the legal device of splitting the copyright, with the 
express purpose of protecting an exclusive distributor’s market, to be entirely 
lawful, and did not consider it to be a sham.
64
 There is no indication from 
the court in the McCarthy case as to why it was necessary, or beneficial, that 
the exclusive distributor should be allowed to be protected in this manner. 
It did not consider the economic benefits of having an exclusive trader for 
the particular product, let alone any consideration of the first-sale doctrine. 
Apart from copyright infringement, it is clear that McCarthy would have 
had no other legal remedy to prevent the parallel importation of the Yamaha 
amplifiers. 
As correctly noted by Rippel and de Villiers, there could be no argument 
for claiming that the parallel importer, Hi-Fi Corporation (Pty) Ltd, was 
unlawfully competing with McCarthy, as the exclusive distributor.
65
 Our 
courts have held that the principle of free and active competition in the 
61 
286.
62 
283.
63 
McCarthy Ltd v Hi-Fi Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2008 1075 JOC (T) 1075-1076.
64 
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65 
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market is public policy in South Africa and monopolies are regarded with 
disfavour.
66
 It is in the interest of consumers that the same, or similar, 
goods can be bought from more than one source because it will result in them 
paying a reasonable price for such goods.
67
 The Appellate Division (now the 
Supreme Court of Appeal) held that competition as such is not unlawful, 
and that, in the absence of statutory protection, there will be no protection 
afforded to a trader if another trader uses the same idea or concept on which 
his product is based, even if the first trader has, through its efforts, built up 
a demand for the product. It is not unlawful competition simply because the 
later, competing trader’s activities affects the first trader’s custom or exploits 
a market that the first trader has established.68 Thus, it has held that parallel 
importation of goods, by itself, will not amount to unlawful competition.
69
 It 
is copyright law which enables an exclusive trader to have a monopoly of the 
relevant imported articles.
70
While the court in the Frank & Hirsch case was careful to limit its order 
to delivery up of the get-up of the cassette tapes, and not the cassette tapes 
themselves, that was sufficient to effectively put an end to the parallel 
importation of such tapes.
71
 Without the original get-up, the importer 
would not be able to convince consumers that the imported tapes were the 
genuine article. So too, attempting to sell amplifiers with alternative front 
panels, although functionally the same, is not an appealing proposition for any 
would-be parallel importer.
In this manner, copyright law can be, and has been, successfully used 
in South Africa to prevent the importation of genuine consumer articles by 
persons other than the exclusive trader.
6 2 US law
The US legal position with respect to the parallel importation of goods 
that include, or comprise, copyright works has been clarified in the Kirtsaeng 
case. The respondent, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (“Wiley”), was a publisher of 
academic textbooks, and the US copyright owner in those books. It assigned 
to its wholly-owned foreign subsidiary, John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd., 
the rights to publish, print, and sell its English-language textbooks outside the 
US (“foreign editions”). These foreign editions typically contained wording 
indicating that they were only for sale outside the US.
72
 
66 
Union Wine Ltd v E Snell and Co Ltd 1990 2 SA 189 (C) 203.
67 
Taylor & Horne (Pty) Ltd v Dentall (Pty) Ltd 1991 1 412 (A) 421-422.
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422.
69 
423.
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It is not being suggested that copyright protection per se amounts to a monopoly. While it is often 
described in those terms, the description of the rights afforded by copyright as monopoly rights is a 
misnomer. A copyright owner generally receives no more of a monopoly than any other property owner. 
Copyright protection rarely confers monopoly power and the attendant social costs such as resource 
misallocation. However, in the case of the current legal position, copyright law does, in fact, allow the 
exclusive trader (to whom the South African copyright has been assigned) a monopoly position in respect 
of the particular product.
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1993 4 SA 279 (A) 288 and 292.
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The appellant, Supap Kirtsaeng, imported copies of the foreign editions 
from Thailand and sold them in the US.
73
 Wiley sued Kirtsaeng for copyright 
infringement, claiming that the unauthorised importation of the foreign 
editions and that their resale infringed its exclusive distribution right, as well 
as the related import prohibition. Kirtsaeng’s defence was that the books 
were “lawfully made” and acquired. Thus, he claimed that he was permitted 
to resell or otherwise dispose of the books without the copyright owner’s 
permission as a consequence of the first-sale doctrine.74
The court upheld Kirtsaeng’s appeal, and reversed the earlier decisions 
that had held him liable for copyright infringement.
75
 A copyright owner’s 
exclusive distribution right, provided for in section 106 of the US Copyright 
Act,
76 is qualified by, amongst other provisions, the first-sale doctrine 
embodied in section 109.
77
 Section 109(a) provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3),
78
 the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord. [underlining added]
79
What the court had to decide was whether the first-sale doctrine applied to 
a copy of copyright work manufactured abroad with the copyright owner’s 
permission, which was bought there and then brought to, and disposed of in, 
the US, given the provisions of section 602(a)(1).
80
 
Section 602(a)(1), similar to section 23(2) of the SA Copyright Act, 
provides that importing a copy of a copyright work without the copyright 
owner’s permission violates the owner’s exclusive distribution right. The 
court held that the importation ban in section 602(a)(1) enhances the copyright 
owner’s exclusive distribution right provided for in section 106.
81
 All that 
had to be decided was whether the words “lawfully made under this title” in 
section 109(a) restricted the scope of the first-sale doctrine geographically, 
that is, whether it made a difference if the copy of the copyright work was 
manufactured abroad.
82
The court held that the position was the same, irrespective of where the 
copies of a copyright work were made, and, therefore, the first-sale doctrine 
also applied to copies lawfully made abroad.
83
 The words “lawfully made 
under this title” mean made “in accordance with” or “in compliance with” 
US copyright law. In casu, the first-sale doctrine applied because – in 
accordance with US law – the copies were manufactured with the permission 
of the relevant copyright owner in the relevant jurisdiction.
84 The first-sale 
73 
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1371.
76 
US Copyright Act.
77 
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doctrine applied only to copies whose making actually complied with the US 
Copyright Act, or would have complied with US Copyright Act had it been 
applicable (that is had the copies been made in the United States). There was 
no basis for any hypothetical postulation (or counterfactual enquiry).
85
 The 
language of section 109(a) did not provide for any geographical limitation.
86
 
This interpretation was consistent with the interpretation of related sections 
in the US Copyright Act, which also contained the words “lawfully made 
under this title.” If the meaning of the words “lawfully made under this 
title” distinguished on the basis of place of manufacture it would create an 
anomalous position, both in relation to the application of the statutory first-
sale doctrine (and with its common-law history), and other provisions of 
the US Copyright Act in which the phrase is used.
87
 Distinguishing goods 
based on place of manufacture would lead to the anomaly that a US copyright 
holder could exercise permanent control over the US distribution chain (sales, 
resales, gifts, and other distribution) in respect of copies printed abroad, but 
not in respect of copies printed in the US.
88
In other words, the first-sale doctrine limited the exclusive distribution 
right, and the complementary importation ban pursuant to section 602(a)
(1).
89
 Thus, a purchaser of a copy of a copyright work which was lawfully 
made in a foreign jurisdiction could import that copy without the US copyright 
owner’s permission.
90
7 Reappraisal of Frank & Hirsch decision
It is submitted that the current South African position relating to the 
interpretation of the deeming provision in section 23(2) is incorrect because 
of two important reasons. First, the legal approach adopted by our courts 
in relation to the deeming provision involved, almost exclusively, a literal 
approach (and the interpretation thereof was, in any event, not a very 
convincing one), without any attempt to contextualise such provision, and 
consider its purpose and consequences. Second, the UK authorities relied on 
as persuasive authority for the current interpretation of the deeming provision, 
were of questionable value. However, before dealing with the aforementioned 
specific criticisms of our current approach to parallel importation, it is 
necessary that we should be clear about why copyright protection exists, and 
what the appropriate scope of that protection should be. The first-sale doctrine 
is an important component in delineating the scope of such protection, and, 
as illustrated below, we have a muddled approach to parallel importation by 
failing to recognise the first-sale doctrine.
85 
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7 1 Purpose of copyright law
The South African position concerning parallel importation rests on 
a particular – distinctly literal – interpretation of section 23(2) of the SA 
Copyright Act, without any attempt to indicate why such interpretation is 
consistent with the rationale for copyright protection. While our courts have 
rejected possible alternative interpretations of the deeming provision because 
it would, apparently, introduce more anomalies, and that such interpretations 
would conflict with the general approach and intention of the SA Copyright 
Act,
91
 there has been no elaboration of those reasons by our courts beyond 
these general assertions. This is possibly because our courts have never 
expressly attempted to articulate the rationale for copyright protection. In 
fact, the Supreme Court of Appeal has expressed its scepticism concerning 
the “philosophical premise” underlying the SA Copyright Act.
92
 
It is respectfully submitted that our case law has focused on the narrow, 
literal issues at stake in a particular case, with very little analysis of those 
issues with reference to the purpose of copyright as a legal institution.
93
 As 
noted above, copyright protection does not originate from our (or English) 
common law, and we need to be a clear as to its purpose. Not that the common 
law is a sacred cow. All law is now subject to the rights enshrined in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (“Constitution”), and no longer 
should our analysis be confined to the literal interpretation of a statute. While 
such an approach may have been acceptable in a pre-Constitutional era, when 
the Frank & Hirsch case was decided, it simply will no longer pass muster. 
The Constitution mandates that our law must be applied in a manner which 
promotes “the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.”
94
 This is not 
to suggest that section 23(2) of the SA Copyright Act is unconstitutional. It 
is simply to stress the point that a court needs to now satisfy itself that its 
application of the law considers the wider implications of a particular legal 
position. If a South African court should be faced with a matter having similar 
facts to the Kirtsaeng case, could it now simply proceed on the basis evidenced 
in the Frank & Hirsch case, without any consideration of, for example, the 
constitutionally enshrined right to education?
95
 Clearly, that can no longer 
be the case.
It is only by having a sound theoretical justification for copyright that we 
can determine the appropriate scope of copyright protection. In the absence of 
such a framework, there is a distinct danger that our approaches to copyright 
issues will be arbitrary or ad hoc. This has, arguably, been the case in the 
approach of our courts to the position concerning copyright law and parallel 
importation. There is no consistent approach in relation to parallel importation 
91 
See, for example, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Anthony Black Films (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 
582 (W) 592.
92 
Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group Plc 2002 4 SA 249 (SCA) 260.
93 
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94 
S 39 of the Constitution.
95 
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and the various other types of intellectual property rights.
96
 This is not to 
deny that a coherent justification for protection of intellectual property, such 
as copyright, is a “formidable task,”
97
 and not so easily discernible.
98
 
However, there should at least be a guiding principle, which can be used to 
bring coherence to our copyright law, and, in that veign, it is submitted that 
it should be an economic one.
99
 By awarding authors proprietary rights in 
their creations, copyright law allows authors the ability to earn direct financial 
returns (and potentially profit) from their efforts; copyright law provides the 
required incentives for authors to create copyright works. 
Given the public-good nature of copyright works, although copyright 
protection is required to address the so-called free-rider problem (and the 
associated market failure), it does impose a social cost. In the absence of 
copyright protection, copyright works can be enjoyed by additional persons 
at negligible, or no extra, cost. It is, therefore, necessary to ensure that a 
copyright owner’s protection extends no further than providing the necessary 
incentives for the production of works protected by copyright, and does not 
unnecessarily increase the social costs of such protection. The first-sale 
doctrine, in a manner similar to the fair-dealing exceptions, seeks to reduce 
the social costs of copyright protection. These devices seek to promote the 
efficient use of copyright works (particularly where the copyright owner may 
have ceased to exploit its copyrighted work
100
), and to reduce transaction 
costs.
101
 Copyright protection is not some inviolate right.
The first-sale doctrine should not should affect the incentives created 
by copyright law, as the copyright owner is able to determine the time of 
publication, number of copies of the copyright work to be distributed, and 
the price it wishes to charge for those copies. Copyright protection allows a 
copyright owner to earn his reward on the first sale of a copy of his work.102 
There is no economic reason why a copyright owner should be protected 
against the circulation of – what from its perspective are – “used” copies of 
its work by third parties.
103
 On the contrary, it may serve to increase sales 
(and probably also the price that could be charged) for a copyright work if a 
purchaser of a copy has the comfort that it is able to dispose it in a secondary 
market, without the copyright owner’s consent. You are referred to the earlier 
example of the purchaser of a motor vehicle. The first-sale doctrine reduces a 
consumer’s opportunity cost and risk of acquiring a copy of copyright work, 
particularly one with which it unfamiliar.
104
 Socially, this is, of course, a 
very important consideration if new authors are to be incentivised to create 
96 
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copyright works. The level of such further trade may also serve as a signal 
to a copyright owner to increase its distribution of the work, or resume the 
distribution thereof, if it had ceased to do so.
When comparing the authoritative South African judgments with those of 
the court in the Kirsaeng case, it is instructive how the US Supreme Court 
was expressly concerned with the economic consequences of the alternative 
arguments. This difference is rather surprising as the court a quo in Frank 
& Hirsch case raised similar concerns relating to copyright and parallel 
importation as did the US Supreme Court, which were largely ignored by 
the Appellate Division.
105
 The court a quo held that to accept the current 
interpretation of the deeming provision would mean that the importer of a 
car which had components such as shock absorbers of another manufacturer 
fitted, upon which a literary or artistic work was printed or painted, could 
be infringing copyright, and copyright law could be used to prohibit the 
importation of the car.
106
 The car itself would not be a copy, reproduction 
or adaptation of the copyright work. The copyright work would merely be 
an accessory component thereof.
107
 Similarly, the US Supreme Court was 
concerned that millions of imported consumer goods that contain copyright 
works, such as computer programs or their packaging, would not be able to 
be resold without the permission of the relevant copyright holder because 
it would amount to copyright infringement.
108
 The dissenting judgment in 
the Kirtsaeng case, rather dismissively, dubbed these practical, economic 
problems as the “parade of horribles.”
109
 
7 1 1 Adoption of the first-sale doctrine
Central to the US Supreme Court’s desire to address these practical, 
economic problems, was a rejection of a geographical limitation of the first-
sale doctrine. In contrast, in the context of copyright law, our courts have either 
completely ignored the first-sale doctrine, or have held that it is inapplicable. 
For example, the court a quo in the Frank & Hirsh case stated that we should 
be wary of considering the first-sale doctrine and the US authorities based 
upon that doctrine, because it was applicable by virtue of US legislation.
110
 As 
illustrated above, that is not so; it has common-law origin. Thus, there is no 
reason why it should not be introduced into South African law.
7 1 2 What is our exhaustion policy?
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(“TRIPS Agreement”), principally article 6 (and, more indirectly, articles 8(2) 
and 40(2)), allows member states of the World Trade Organisation, of which 
105 
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South Africa is one, to determine their own exhaustion regimes.
111
 Although 
our courts have refused to consider the first-sale doctrine,112 and, accordingly, 
indicate what type of exhaustion policy we adhere to in South Africa, it is 
worthwhile considering whether, in any event, the current interpretation of 
section 23(2) is, in substance, equivalent to a particular type of exhaustion. At 
first glance, the current interpretation of the deeming provision may appear 
to amount to a policy of national exhaustion, given the fact that parallel 
importation of copies of a copyright work emanating from another jurisdiction 
may be prevented. However, as indicated above, whether a particular article 
constitutes an infringing copy is not determined by its origin, but rather by the 
extent of the manufacturer’s rights under copyright. If the manufacturer could 
have lawfully produced the copy in South Africa, it is not an infringing copy, 
and the importation of such article is permitted, without any copyright-law 
restrictions. This is clearly demonstrated in the Twentieth Century Fox case.
113
 
In the Twentieth Century Fox case, the UK manufacturer of the video 
cassettes containing copies of the relevant copyright works (cinematograph 
films) had a licence to manufacture those copies in both the United Kingdom 
and South Africa.
114
 Accordingly, the importation of such video cassettes 
from the UK did not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the 
relevant cinematograph films pursuant to section 23(2) of the SA Copyright 
Act.
115
 This was the case even if the relevant South African copyright owner 
had granted another trader (or licensee) the exclusive rights to distribute such 
copies in South Africa. Such exclusive trader was not able to prevent such 
imports.
Accordingly, the South African legal position does not amount to a policy 
of national or international exhaustion. While it would almost certainly be the 
case that copyright owner’s national distribution rights are exhausted in South 
Africa if it has authorised the distribution of copies of its copyright work 
in South Africa, our legal position is not one of national exhaustion. This is 
because our courts have decided that the issues of parallel importation are to 
be determined with reference to the geographic extent of the manufacturer’s 
rights to produce the copies, namely, whether it extends to South Africa. The 
question of parallel importation is not determined by reference to the place of 
an authorised distribution of the copy of a copyright work, as is the case in 
questions of exhaustion. Our courts have, unnecessarily, muddied the waters, 
leaving us with a confused legal position relating to parallel importation. They 
should make every effort to address the issue in a more principled manner 
when next given the opportunity, if the matter has not been addressed by 
the legislation by then. The first-sale doctrine allows for a more principled 
111 
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approach to consider relevant factors, which are currently absent from our 
legal analysis.
Interestingly, prior to the Kirtsaeng case, the US government was 
considered to be the foremost proponent of a policy of national exhaustion, 
which policy was thought to be motivated by its national interest in protecting 
the significant US copyright industry.116 It was this fact which prompted the 
dissenting judges in the Kirtsaeng case to express their difficulty in reconciling 
the majority’s finding with the supposed meaning of the US Copyright Act’s 
provisions and its history.
117
 The majority’s decision in the Kirtsaeng case had 
now established the principle of international exhaustion in the United States, 
which the United States had steadfastly resisted.
118
 Of course, the majority 
considered their position to be in accordance with the legislative intent.
119
 
The majority was clear: if it had misconstrued what the US exhaustion policy 
ought to be, it was up to the legislature, Congress, to provide for a system of 
national exhaustion.
120
 
7 1 3 A serious anomaly of our current position
Not only does our current copyright position relating to parallel importation 
not amount to any recognised exhaustion policy, it leads to a rather anomalous 
position concerning the status of articles protected by copyright which have 
been manufactured elsewhere. For example, on the facts of Frank & Hirsch 
case, Frank & Hirsch could have – subject, of course, to its contractual 
obligations towards TDK Japan or trade mark law – imported counterfeit 
TDK cassette tapes which it sourced from third parties elsewhere. It is 
Frank & Hirsch, as the South African copyright owner, who is given the 
exclusive right to determine whether those cassette tapes would be regarded 
as infringing copies. Clearly, no one, other than Frank & Hirsch in South 
Africa, would be able to claim that such articles did not infringe copyright, 
but our approach to parallel importation permits that anomalous possibility. 
Perhaps it is this concern that makes foreign manufacturers wary of assigning 
the South African copyright to a local exclusive trader, and why section 23(2) 
has not been used more often to prevent parallel importation.
121
7 2 English cases cited
Apart from the aforementioned principled criticism of the approach 
followed by our courts (which I will again return to below), the preferred 
interpretation of the deeming provision was principally based on the approach 
followed in two English cases on the interpretation of an equivalent provision, 
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namely, section 16(2), in the UK Copyright Act 1956: Polydor Ltd & Another 
v Harlequin Record Shop & Another
122
 and CBS United Kingdom Ltd v 
Charmdale Record Distributors Ltd
123
.
124
 The aforementioned cases were, at 
best, of questionable value as support for the courts’ preferred interpretation.
Although there was no authority relating to the interpretation of the 
equivalent UK provision,
125
 the court in the Polydor case – despite it only 
involving motion proceedings for an interlocutory injunction – did not admit 
to any other possible interpretation of the provision, and did not consider it 
to be a difficult question of law requiring any “detailed argument and mature 
consideration.”
126 Its confidence is somewhat perplexing as it in fact cites a 
New Zealand decision, which dealt with the equivalent New Zealand statutory 
provision, in which the New Zealand court acknowledges that interpretation 
of the section “is indeed troublesome.”
127
 Furthermore, the New Zealand court 
came to a different conclusion to that of the court in the Polydor case. The 
New Zealand court appeared to regard lawful copies, that is, those made by 
any person specifically authorised by the copyright owner, as non-infringing 
copies.
128
However, the Polydor court’s confidence in its conviction that its 
interpretation was correct was clearly not as convincing as it would appear 
at first glance, as it was “glad” that the court in the CBS case agreed with its 
interpretation.
129
 Although the CBS case was decided after the Polydor case, 
the court in the Polydor case managed to get access to the transcript of the 
CBS judgment.
130
 What makes the Polydor case even more problematic as 
persuasive authority is that the CBS case used the Polydor case as the basis 
for its assumption that the provision should be interpreted in that manner.
131
 
In fact, the court in the CBS case, similar to the New Zealand court, admitted 
that it had no “clear concept of the exact purpose which the section was 
designed to achieve,” and that there was no fully-argued authority on the 
proper interpretation of the section.
132
 A case of circular precedent, if ever 
there was one.
133
7 3 Property, contract, corporate veils and competition
For completeness sake, it is necessary to consider briefly the relevance of 
other areas of law, such as contract law, company law, and competition law, to 
the regulation of parallel importation, or other practices by which a copyright 
122 
Polydor Limited & Another v Harlequin Record Shop & Another [1980] FSR 194.
123 
CBS United Kingdom Ltd v Charmdale Record Distributors Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 807.
124 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Anthony Black Films (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 582 (W) 590-591.
125 
Polydor Limited & Another v Harlequin Record Shop & Another [1980] FSR 199.
126 
200.
127 
CBS United Kingdom Ltd v Charmdale Record Distributors Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 813-814.
128 
814.
129 
Polydor Limited & Another v Harlequin Record Shop & Another [1980] FSR 200.
130 
200.
131 
CBS United Kingdom Ltd v Charmdale Record Distributors Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 812.
132 
813 and 815.
133 
The court in the CBS case contradicted itself when considering the position of a copyright owner, as 
opposed to a licensee (see CBS United Kingdom Ltd v Charmdale Record Distributors Ltd [1980] 2 All 
ER 816).
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owner seeks to control the distribution of copyrighted works beyond the first 
sale.
Already from its inception in the case of Bobbs-Merrill Co, there was clearly 
no suggestion that a post-sale restriction by way of contract was not possible. 
As indicated in that case, the restriction sought to be imposed by notice was 
not enforceable as an infringement of copyright, and there was no privity 
of contract between Bobbs-Merrill Co and the respondents.
134
 Accordingly, 
the first-sale doctrine does not appear – at least in US law135 – to prevent a 
copyright owner from imposing, by way of contract, a post-sale restriction on 
a recipient of a copy of a copyright work, such as limiting where the copy can 
be resold, to whom, and at what price. The enforceability, or validity of such 
contracts, or restrictions, will depend on the relevant principles of contract 
law, and competition law relating to vertical restrictive practices. For example, 
the legality of the agreement might be in issue, or the agreement may be held 
to substantially prevent or lessen competition in a market.
136
If downstream trade in a copy of a copyright work could be prevented 
by contract law (provided it does not conflict with competition law) it may, 
in one – theoretical – respect, be even more powerful than copyright law. 
Copyright protection is of limited duration, while contractual rights could 
endure indefinitely. However, given the generous period of copyright 
protection, it is unlikely that the copyright owner would have any remaining 
economic interest which would be worth protecting, and which it could prove 
has been damaged, beyond the period of copyright protection. There is a more 
important reason why it would be socially beneficial to limit such attempted 
restrictions on further trade in copies of copyright works to the regulation by 
contract law (or competition law).
Copyright law creates a proprietary right in the protected copyright work. 
Accordingly, breaches of copyright are invariably protected by a property 
rule.
137
 The principal remedy for a breach of copyright is an interdict 
restraining the infringer from performing the relevant restricted act. Dean 
stresses the proprietary nature of the remedy, by stating that “the failure by 
the court to grant an interdict would abrogate the very nature of copyright in 
a work.”
138
 If such vertical post-sale restrictions could be enforced based on 
copyright law, the relative strength of a proprietary entitlement could pose 
a threat in circumstances where the restrictions sought to be enforced are 
socially harmful.
139
 Moreover, as property rule, it can be enforced against 
third parties, with whom the copyright owner has no contractual relationship. 
In addition to the interdict, copyright law has assisted the copyright owner 
134 
Bobbs-Merrill Co v Straus & Another 1908 210 US 350-351.
135 
As will be discussed below, this is not the case in Europe.
136 
Of course, minimum resale price maintenance is expressly prohibited in South Africa (s 5(2), Competition 
Act 89 of 1998).
137 
A property rule gives its holder an absolute right to enforce legal entitlement, and the holder can only be 
deprived thereof by agreeing to dispose of such an entitlement. Such an entitlement is typically protected 
by way of injunctions or orders for specific performance. See C Veljanovski Economic Principles of Law 
(2007) 54-55.
138 
Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law 1-127.
139 
Katz (2014) BYU Law Review 68.
654 STELL LR 2015 3
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
with difficulties it may have in establishing its damages suffered, allowing 
it claim a reasonable royalty in lieu of damages,
140
 and the possibility of 
additional damages.
141
 This makes copyright infringement proceedings a 
particularly potent remedy, and one that is much more likely to be invoked 
than a party seeking to prevent a breach of contract.
142
The strength of copyright remedies to prevent infringement in relation to 
copies of a copyright work in the context of parallel importation – which we 
should remember, in this context, were lawfully produced – appears to be 
excessive. This is particularly the case when our courts have not attempted to 
engage with the doctrine of exhaustion, and have not expressly indicated what 
our current exhaustion policy is. The first-sale doctrine serves as a limitation 
on the extent to which a copyright owner can control (and possibly distort) 
the market for copies of its copyright work; it “reflects the law’s sensitivity 
to the differences between the costs and benefits of contract as opposed to 
property entitlements.”
143
 In the absence of a clearly-articulated preference for 
national exhaustion, copyright law should rather err on the side of allowing 
consumers the benefit of a market in which free competition for a particular 
copyright-protected good is allowed. We should, therefore, in the absence 
of an empirically-based economic analysis adopt a policy of international 
exhaustion.
Matters concerning intellectual property law, such as copyright law, and 
which clearly have an effect on the operation, and nature, of the market for 
a particular good should not be decided without reference to the economic 
consequences. This is, arguably, also the intention of the Competition Act, which 
contains no exception for intellectual property. Given the strategic advantage 
which the property rule created by copyright law gives the copyright owner 
in relation to claims of copyright infringement, there is, at present, no reason, 
other than a questionable literal interpretation of the deeming provision, why 
such disputes should not be left to be regulated by competition law. For example, 
if the application of copyright law, in effect, results in a vertically restrictive 
practice – when such effect is not required to enable copyright protection to 
satisfy its incentivising purpose – that situation should be subject to scrutiny in 
terms of competition law. Our courts have taken an unduly restrictive approach 
in their consideration of issues, focussing, for example, on the literal meaning 
of the statutory provisions or contract law, instead of considering the economic 
consequences of particular arrangements.
The current interpretation of the deeming provision gives no consideration 
to whether a copyright owner has engaged in a deliberate partitioning of 
markets (by, for example, splitting its copyright in the different jurisdictions 
and assigning it to different subsidiaries) to exercise possible price 
discrimination in order to maximise its profits. In the absence of competition 
law, the only other remedy available to a parallel importer seeking to prevent 
140 
S 24(1A) of the SA Copyright Act.
141 
S 24(3).
142 
Katz (2014) BYU Law Review 73.
143 
100.
THE FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE 655
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
such a flagrant exercise to partition markets would have to be by way of an 
exceptional remedy such as piercing of the corporate veil. If the parallel 
importer could succeed in demonstrating that the copyright in the territory 
from which it has imported its goods, and that in South Africa, is, in effect, 
owned by or derived from the same person, the imported good should not be 
considered to be infringing copies. 
As can be seen from the Kirtsaeng case, with a policy of international 
exhaustion it becomes unnecessary to consider the validity of a copyright 
owner’s actions to split the ownership of its copyright, by assigning its 
copyright in the various jurisdictions to different persons. Our courts, unlike 
US law, have also, in any event, never developed a copyright-misuse doctrine, 
which seeks to prevent copyright holders from using their rights under 
copyright in order to allow them to control areas which are rightly regulated 
by another area of law, such as competition law. 
144
8 The purpose of the deeming provision
Having expressed the view that the interpretation of the deeming provision 
adopted by our courts, involving a hypothetical postulation, has led to a confused 
position in respect of parallel importation, the question remains as to what the 
deeming provision was meant to deal with. As indicated above, before the 
Polydor and CBS cases in the UK, there was no decision on the meaning of the 
deeming provision. The leading English textbooks prior to the aforementioned 
decisions contained no commentary on what the deeming provision meant; 
there was certainly no suggestion that the hypothetical postulation adopted by 
the English and South African courts was correct, or intended. In fact, the court 
in the Polydor case dismissed a plausible alternative hypothesis, namely, that 
the goods were made in similar circumstances to that made in England.
145
 This 
is, of course, the approach adopted by US Supreme Court in the Kirtsaeng case. 
This would essentially involve an enquiry whether the imported articles had 
been made in infringing circumstances where they were actually manufactured. 
If not, then such imported articles could not be said to constitute infringing 
copies under the SA Copyright Act. Accordingly, the issue should simply be 
whether the article was lawfully made in the other jurisdiction, namely, by, or 
with the consent of, the copyright owner in that jurisdiction. 
It is submitted that there is no greater mischief that the deeming provision 
seeks to address than to prevent the importation of counterfeit articles. This 
interpretation also accords with the proposed position argued for by Rippel 
and de Villiers.
146
 What makes this interpretation (with the resultant policy 
of international exhaustion) particularly convincing, and neat, is not merely 
the fact that there was nothing in the legislative history indicating that it 
was meant to be deal with anything other than counterfeit copies. In fact, as 
illustrated earlier, the current interpretation of the deeming permission means 
that the South African copyright owner can condone any counterfeiting 
144 
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145 
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146 
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activity which may have taken place elsewhere. This would almost certainly 
conflict with its treaty obligations.
Incidentally, Prof Owen Dean, who acted for Frank & Hirsch, was rather 
candid and honest with the author concerning the interpretation of the deeming 
provision which they argued for, and which the Appellate Division, of course, 
accepted. In a conversation with the author, he stated that the particular 
interpretation was not based on any legislative history of section 23(2). The 
fact is that the interpretation simply suited their case.
9 Exhaustion and digital works
While the aforementioned analysis may already have served to indicate the 
shortcomings in our current approach to parallel importation, our approach 
becomes even starker should our courts have to consider the legal position 
relating to digital works. The benefit of having a well-developed first-sale 
doctrine is illustrated by recent European decisions involving digital works.
For an increasing number of copyright works, the first-sale doctrine has to 
take account of modern methods of distribution. In some respects, the issue 
of what constitutes an imported article is rendered redundant with digital 
distribution. Increasingly, we are getting copies of copyright works in digital 
form, without the need for a copyright owner to use a physical medium to 
distribute such works. For example, music can now be distributed via digital 
downloads over the Internet, and literary works are available as ebooks, 
as well as printed copies. This has raised the issue of whether the first-sale 
doctrine also applies to the distribution of a digital copy of a copyright work, 
as it would if such work were distributed via a physical medium. For purposes 
of this discussion, it must be assumed that the further “sale” of the digital 
copy of the copyright work does not involve the making of an illegal (or 
additional) copy of the work. For example, it would involve the purchaser of 
an ebook deleting the copy of the literary work from his electronic device and 
allowing another person to gain access to the digital copy. In fact, as a result 
of technological protective mechanisms such as digital rights management, a 
copyright owner is able to verify that there is, at any time, the relevant number 
of copies of its copyright work.
Interestingly, while the US has adopted a creditable position in relation to 
the use of copyright law, and the first-sale doctrine, in relation to parallel 
importation, it has failed to develop the first-sale doctrine in the face of digital 
distribution of copyright works. As noted, while the US courts have tended to 
display an awareness of the economic consequences of legal regulation, they 
appear to have adopted a surprisingly rigid approach to the development of the 
first-sale doctrine in relation to digital works. In fact, it is the European Court 
of Justice (“ECJ”) that has now taken the lead in developing the first-sale 
doctrine in relation to digital works. The approach of the US courts is amply 
illustrated by two cases: Vernor v Autodesk Inc,
147
 and Capitol Records LLC 
v ReDigi Inc.
148
 
147 
Vernor v Autodesk Inc 2010 621 F 3d 1102.
148 
Capitol Records LLC v ReDigi Inc 2013 934 F Supp 2d 640.
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In Vernor v Autodesk Inc, Vernor attempted to resell copies of Autodesk’s 
computer software, which Autodesk claimed constituted copyright 
infringement.
149
 Autodesk distributed its software pursuant to a nonexclusive 
and non-transferable licence, which, inter alia, prohibited customers from 
transferring the software without Autodesk’s prior consent.
150
 The court 
considered the crux of the case to be whether Autodesk’s customers owned 
their copies of the software, or were only licensed the copies. This was so 
because it claimed that the first-sale doctrine applied only in the former 
case, that is, if the customer owned the copy of the software. In that case, 
the customer could resell its copy of the software, as Autodesk’s exclusive 
distribution right would have been exhausted as a result of the application 
the first-sale doctrine.151 This was apparently because section 109(a), and the 
common-law doctrine, limited its application to an “owner” of a copy of a 
copyright work, and did not apply to licensee.
152
In the Capitol Records case the legal issue was whether a digital music 
file, lawfully downloaded and purchased, could be resold.153 The court held 
that such resale necessarily involved a transfer of a digital music file over the 
Internet, which constituted an unlawful reproduction and distribution of the 
relevant sound recording.
154
 As a consequence of the wording of the statutory 
first-sale doctrine, the resale of the sound recordings were not protected by 
the first-sale doctrine because it was limited to the distribution of material 
items, like records. In casu, the resale involved the making of a reproduction 
of the relevant sound recording.
155
 If this position was unsatisfactory, given 
the technological changes which have taken place, it should be amended 
by the legislature.
156
 Interestingly, the court expressed no view on whether 
a purchaser was simply a licensee in respect of the digital music, or on the 
specific contractual provisions.
In contrast, the ECJ’s position is clearly illustrated in UsedSoft GmbH v 
Oracle International Corp case.
157
 Oracle was the proprietor of the relevant 
software (computer programs), which was distributed as a download over the 
Internet or supplied on CD-ROM or DVD.
158
 Its licence agreements for the 
software provided that the licence was for an unlimited period, non-exclusive, 
and non-transferable.
159
 UsedSoft sold software licences it acquired from 
Oracle’s customers,
160
 which Oracle sought to prevent.
161
 The issue was 
whether the doctrine of exhaustion of the distribution right under article 4(2) of 
149 
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150 
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151 
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152 
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154 
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155 
655.
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the Software Directive
162
 applied to computer programs, whether downloaded 
from over the Internet, or distributed on a data carrier (physical medium), 
such as a CD-ROM or DVD.
163
 That would, in turn, determine whether a 
UsedSoft customer was a “lawful acquirer” of a copy of the software, and 
would enable such customer to use the software.
164
 
The ECJ held that whether the copyright in a situation such as Oracle’s was 
exhausted had to be determined with reference to the contractual relationship 
between the rightsholder and its customer, within which the downloading of 
the copy of the software took place.
165
 Therefore, the commercial transaction 
giving rise to a “sale” for the exhaustion of the right of distribution of a copy 
of the software in accordance with article 4(2) had to involve a transfer of 
the right of ownership in that copy.
166
 Legally, the downloading of a copy 
of the software and the conclusion of the user licence agreement formed an 
indivisible whole, as the software could not otherwise be used.
167
 
In determining whether there was the transfer of the right of ownership of 
the copy of the software in question, it was significant that a customer who 
downloaded the copy obtained a right to use it for an unlimited period. Thus, 
the intention was that the customer would have permanent use thereof, in 
return for payment of a fee designed to enable the copyright holder to obtain 
a remuneration corresponding to the economic value of the copy of the work 
to Oracle, as its proprietor.
168
Legally, it made no difference whether the copy of the software was 
downloaded or distributed by means of a material medium such as a CD-ROM 
or DVD. In both cases, the use of the software involved the making of a copy 
of the software, and the transfer of the right of ownership in that copy.
169
 
Article 4(2) of the Software Directive did not distinguish between software 
distributed on a tangible medium or intangible form over the Internet as to 
when the exhaustion of the right of distribution applies.
170
From an economic point of view, there was no difference between the sale 
of software on a physical medium or via download over the Internet. The 
distribution in intangible form over the Internet was the functional equivalent 
of the supply of software on a physical medium.
171
 If there was no exhaustion of 
the distribution right in respect of the distribution of the software in intangible 
form, the copyright holder could control the resale of copies downloaded from 
the Internet, and demand further remuneration on the occasion of each new 
sale, even though the first sale of the copy had already enabled the rightholder 
162 
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to obtain an appropriate remuneration. Such a restriction would go beyond 
what is necessary to safeguard the software.
172
Thus, article 4(2) of the Software Directive had to be interpreted as meaning 
that the right of distribution of a copy of a computer program is exhausted 
if the copyright holder has authorised the downloading of a copy from the 
Internet for an unlimited period of use, in return for payment of a fee (or even 
free of charge) corresponding to the economic value of the copy of the work to 
the copyright holder.
173
 Moreover, the consequence of the exhaustion of the 
distribution right will negate any contractual terms by which the copyright 
owner seeks to prohibit the resale of that copy of the computer program.
174
 
Thus, in Europe the first-sale doctrine may trump any contractual post-sale 
restriction sought to be imposed by the copyright owner.
10 Conclusion
There are serious shortcomings in our current approach to copyright law 
and parallel importation, and this is primarily due to a refusal by our courts 
to engage with the doctrine of exhaustion in our law. Consequently we have a 
rather confused approach to parallel importation, and will, no doubt, have no 
principled approach when confronted with issues relating to digital works.
175
 
Analysing vexing issues concerning the development of copyright in the face 
of emerging technologies is best done if there is clarity on the purpose, and 
scope, of copyright law, otherwise the development of copyright law will, 
arguably, be ad hoc and unpredictable.
If our courts refuse to develop the law in a principled manner, the legislature 
should consider stepping in. However, as mentioned before, this article is not 
to justify, economically, a case for or against parallel importation. It merely 
expresses serious concerns about the current ability of copyright law to 
prevent parallel importation, without regard to any additional considerations, 
such as economic consequences. The use of copyright to partition markets 
to enable price discrimination, arguably, goes beyond the purpose, and the 
proper scope, of copyright law. Such use of copyright law is, it is submitted, 
not sanctioned by the SA Copyright Act.
The comparison between the US and EU concerning digital works again 
illustrated the difference a more thorough analysis can make. While the US 
courts’ approach was a rigid, formulaic application of the law, focussing on 
the narrow issues of contract law (engaging in only a superficial consideration 
of the first-sale doctrine), while the ECJ considered the matter at a more 
fundamental level. It considered the proper scope of copyright law and the 
economic nature of the particular transactions.
Irrespective of the economic arguments for, or against, parallel importation, 
(or even if we simply adopt a system of national exhaustion) the use of copyright 
172 
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173 
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175 
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in the labels, packaging, or accompanying documentation, of consumer 
products should not be the basis on which the parallel importation of those 
goods should be prevented. It is an abuse of copyright. Allowing reliance on 
copyright law to prevent the importation of consumer goods based on such 
ancillary matter does not serve to incentivise creative endeavours. The authors 
of those ancillary copyright works have been appropriately remunerated by 
the firms which employ or commission them to create such works. A person 
whose artistic work is embodied in the packaging of a cassette tape is unlikely 
to be remunerated based on the number of tapes sold (or even be offered 
remuneration on that basis). Having regard to the justification for copyright 
protection, the reliance on the use of copyright in ancillary copyright works to 
prevent parallel importation should not be allowed.
SUMMARY
This article critically reassesses the South African legal position in relation to copyright law and 
parallel importation, using the decision of the US Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons Inc 
to highlight the shortcomings in our current approach. The South African legal position concerning 
parallel importation is based on a narrow literal interpretation of the section 23(2) of the Copyright Act 
1978, based on questionable UK case law. This approach fails to properly contextualise the relevant 
statutory provision, taking into account the purpose and scope of copyright law. 
What is required is a more far-reaching analysis of parallel importation, based on principles, and 
the effects on consumer welfare. Such analysis should include consideration of the first-sale doctrine 
(or doctrine of exhaustion), which has been employed and developed in the leading jurisdictions on 
intellectual property law. Our courts have refused to consider the first-sale doctrine in the context of 
parallel importation, or, indeed, any other context concerning intellectual property law. The article 
provides an account of the origin, purpose, and effect the first-sale doctrine. By failing to consider 
the first-sale doctrine, our current approach to parallel importation is confused, and is not based on 
sound theoretical principles. The need for our courts to consider the first-sale doctrine extends beyond 
parallel importation. It is also relevant to how we develop copyright law in relation to digital copyright 
works. The development of copyright law in the face of emerging technologies is best done if there is 
clarity on the purpose, and scope, of copyright law, otherwise the development of copyright law will 
be ad hoc and unpredictable. Development of the first-sale doctrine in South African law will help to 
ground our law on a more coherent theoretical foundation.
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